The neural correlate of (un)awareness: lessons from the vegetative state by Laureys, Steven
ces Vol.9 No.12 December 2005Update TRENDS in Cognitive Scien556The neural correlate of (un)awareness:
lessons from the vegetative state
Steven Laureys












sleepConsciousness has two main components: wakefulness
and awareness. The vegetative state is characterized by
wakefulness without awareness. Recent functional
neuroimaging results have shown that some parts of
the cortex are still functioning in ‘vegetative’ patients.
External stimulation, such as a painful stimulus, still
activates ‘primary’ sensory cortices in these patients but
these areas are functionally disconnected from ‘higher
order’ associative areas needed for awareness. Such
studies are disentangling the neural correlates of the
vegetative state from the minimally conscious state, and
have major clinical consequences in addition to empiri-
cal importance for the understanding of consciousness.
Vegetative patients look ‘awake’ but fail to show any
behavioral sign of awareness. For family members – and
inexperienced physicians and ethical policy makers – it is
difficult to accept that patients’ reflexive movements do
not reflect consciousness. This reveals their (understand-
able) lack of clarity about the nature of consciousness, and
especially its dual aspects of the dimensions of wakeful-
ness and awareness.
Recent neuroimaging studies are revealing how wake-
fulness and awareness can be separated in the vegetative
state, illuminating the relationships between awareness
and (i) global brain function, (ii) regional brain function,
(iii) changes in functional connectivity, and (iv) cortical
activation of primary versus associative areas in response
to external stimulation, highlighting issues concerning
the possible perception of pain.TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences 


















Figure 1. Oversimplified illustration of the two major components of conscious-
ness: the level of consciousness (i.e. wakefulness or arousal) and the content of
consciousness (i.e. awareness or experience). In normal physiological states (blue-
green) level and content are positively correlated (with the exception of dream
activity during REM-sleep). Patients in pathological or pharmacological coma (that
is, general anesthesia) are unconscious because they cannot be awakened (red).
Dissociated states of consciousness (i.e. patients being seemingly awake but
lacking any behavioral evidence of ‘voluntary’ or ‘willed’ behavior), such as theConsciousness, awareness and wakefulness
Consciousness is a multifaceted concept that has two
major components: awareness of environment and of self
(i.e. the content of consciousness) and wakefulness (i.e. the
level of consciousness) (Figure 1). You need to be awake to
be aware (REM-sleep being a notable exception). The
contrastive approach as first proposed by Baars [1]
(comparing brain activation in circumstances that do or
do not give rise to consciousness in either of its two main
senses of awareness and wakefulness) is now widely
applied in functional neuroimaging studies. Very few
groups, however, have studied situations in which
wakefulness and awareness are dissociated. The most
tragic example is the vegetative state. Here, patientsCorresponding author: Laureys, S. (steven.laureys@ulg.ac.be).
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interaction with their environment.
Vegetative patients have their eyes wide open but are
considered – by definition – to be unaware of themselves or
their surroundings. They may grimace, cry or smile (albeit
never contingent upon specific external stimuli) and move
their eyes, head and limbs in a meaningless ‘automatic’
manner. The vegetative state is often, but not always,
chronic (the ‘persistent vegetative state’). Given proper
medical care (i.e. artificial hydration and nutrition)
patients can survive for many years.
How certain can physicians be that these patients are
completely unaware and insensate? As one author
expresses the dilemma, ‘Might a grimace in response to
pain not indicate a glimmer of awareness?’ [2]. It is known
that when the diagnosis is made with insufficient care, up
to one in three ‘vegetative’ patients actually are conscious
– at least ‘minimally conscious’ [2]. Clinical misdiagnosis
is partly explained by the inherent difficulties in detecting
signs of awareness in patients with fluctuating arousalvegetative state or much more transient equivalents such as absence and complex
partial seizures and sleepwalking (purple), offer a unique opportunity to study the
neural correlates of awareness.
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Figure 2. PET images illustrating that overall cerebral metabolic rates for glucose
are about twice as high in the ‘conscious waking state’ (a) (Laureys et al.,
unpublished), as compared with altered states of wakefulness such as general
anesthesia (b) (from [3]), and deep sleep (c) (adapted from [4]). In the vegetative
state (i.e. wakeful unawareness) overall global cortical metabolism can sometimes
have close-to-normal values (d) (patient 5 from [5] in a vegetative state following
herniation and bilateral paramedian mesodiencephalic injury (red arrow). By
contrast, vegetative patients who recover might show no substantial increase in
global metabolic function: (e) patient scanned in a vegetative state following CO
intoxication; (f) same patient, in whom full recovery of awareness was
accompanied by restoration of activity solely in frontoparietal areas (white arrows;
adapted from [7]).
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neuroimaging studies are now measuring neural activity
at rest and during external (for example ‘painful’)
stimulation in these patients. In addition to its clinical
and ethical importance, studying the vegetative state
offers a still largely underestimated means of studying
human consciousness. In contrast to other unconscious
states such as general anesthesia and deep sleep, where
impairment in arousal cannot be disentangled from
impairment in awareness, we are here offered a unique
lesional approach enabling us to identify the neural
correlates of (un)awareness.
Awareness and global brain function
Is awareness lost when overall cortical activity falls bellow
a certain threshold? PET studies modulating arousal, and
hence awareness, by means of anesthetic drugs have
shown a drop in global brain metabolism to around half of
normal values [3]. Similar global decreases in metabolic
activity are observed in deep sleep [4], although in REM-
sleep brain metabolism returns to normal waking values.
In the vegetative state, that is in ‘wakefulness without
awareness’, global metabolic activity also decreases to
about 50% of normal levels [5,6]. However, in some
patients who subsequently recovered, global metabolic
rates for glucose metabolism did not show substantial
changes [7]. Moreover, some awake healthy volunteers
have global brain metabolism values comparable to those
observed in some patients in a vegetative state (Laureys
et al., unpublished). Inversely, some well-documented
vegetative patients have shown close to normal global
cortical metabolism [5] (Figure 2).
Hence, the relationship between global levels of brain
function and the presence or absence of awareness is not
absolute. It seems that some areas in the brain are more
important than others for its emergence. Can these
‘awareness-regions’ be identified?
‘Awareness-regions’ in the brain?
Voxel-based statistical analyses have sought to identify
regions showing metabolic dysfunction in the vegetative
state as compared with the conscious resting state in
healthy controls. These studies have identified a metabolic
dysfunction, not in one brain region but in a wide
frontoparietal network encompassing the polymodal
associative cortices: lateral and medial frontal regions
bilaterally, parieto-temporal and posterior parietal areas
bilaterally, posterior cingulate and precuneal cortices [6],
known to be the most active ‘by default’ in resting non-
stimulated conditions [8] (see Box 1).
Current analysis techniques now also allow the
assessment of awareness-related changes in functional
integration – that is, measuring differences in functional
cerebral connectivity between vegetative patients and
healthy controls.
Vegetative state as a disconnection syndrome
Awareness seems not to be exclusively related to activity
in the frontoparietal network, but equally important is
the relation of awareness to the functional connectivity
within this network, and with the thalami. ‘Functionalwww.sciencedirect.comdisconnections’ in long-range cortico–cortical (between
latero-frontal and midline-posterior areas) and cortico–
thalamo–cortical (between non-specific thalamic nuclei
and lateral and medial frontal cortices) pathways have
been identified in the vegetative state [6,9]. Moreover,
recovery is accompanied by a functional restoration of
the frontoparietal network [7] and some of its cortico–
thalamo–cortical connections [9]. In addition to measuring
resting brain function and connectivity, recent neuro-
imaging studies have identified brain areas that still show
activation during external stimulation in
vegetative patients.Do patients in a vegetative state feel or hear anything?
The most relevant question here is with regard to possible
residual pain perception in ‘vegetative’ patients.
Studies using high-intensity electrical stimulation
(experienced as painful in controls) showed robust post-
stimulus activation in brainstem, thalamus and primary
somatosensory cortex in each of 15 well-documented
vegetative patients [10]. Importantly, higher-order areas
of the pain matrix (that is, secondary somatosensory,
insular, posterior parietal and anterior cingulate cortices)
were not activated. Moreover, the activated primary
somatosensory cortex was isolated from the frontoparietal
network, which is thought to be required for
conscious perception.
Similarly, auditory stimulation in unambiguously
vegetative patients activated primary auditory cortices
but not higher-order multimodal areas from which they
were disconnected [11,12]. The activation in primary
Box 1. Other dissociated states of concsiousness
It is not only the vegetative state that shows dissociation between
awareness and wakefulness. In some other conditions patients also
are seemingly ‘wakeful’ and may show automatic albeit non-
purposeful behavior:
Seizures
Absence seizures present as brief episodes (5–10s) of staring and
unresponsiveness, often accompanied by eye-blinking and lip-
smacking. fMRI studies have shown widespread deactivations in
frontoparietal associative cortices during these absences [18]. Tem-
poral lobe seizures can also impair consciousness (they are then
classified as ‘complex partial’, as opposed to ‘simple partial’ if they
terminate without impaired consciousness). Loss of responsiveness in
complex partial seizures usually persists for up to several minutes and
patients might show oral and manual automatisms (e.g. picking,
fumbling, cyclic movements). Contrasting ictal (i.e. during seizure)
with interictal conditions again revealed ‘marked bilateral deactivation
in frontal and parietal association cortex. By contrast, temporal lobe
seizures in which consciousness was spared were not accompanied
by these widespread changes’ [19].
Sleepwalking
Somnambulism (an abnormal condition occurring during deep sleep)
is another example of transient non-responsiveness with partially
preserved arousal and semi-purposeful behavior, such as walking. In
one patient – the only one studied with imaging techniques so far – it
was reported that ‘large areas of frontal and parietal association









Figure I. The common hallmark of the vegetative state seems to be metabolic dysfunction of a widespread cortical network encompassing medial and lateral prefrontal
cortices and parietal multimodal associative areas (a). The dysfunction might be due either to direct cortical damage or to cortico–cortical [6] or cortico–thalamo–cortical
disconnections [9] (schematized by blue arrows). Recent functional imaging studies in similar, but transient, dissociations between wakefulness and awareness resulting
in ‘automatic’ unwilled action have shown decreased blood flow in this frontoparietal network when patients suffer from (b) complex partial seizures (reduced blood flow
in green; single photon computed emission tomography [SPECT] data from [19]), (c) absence seizures (in blue; fMRI data from [18]) and (d) sleepwalking (in yellow;
SPECT data from [20]).
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Crick and Koch’s early hypothesis (based on visual
perception and monkey histological connectivity [13])
that neural activity in primary cortices is necessary but
not sufficient for awareness.
In summary, vegetative patients still show cerebral
activation but this seems to be limited to subcortical and
‘low-level’ primary cortical areas, disconnected from the
fronto-parietal network necessary for awareness. A final
question is whether functional neuroimaging can disen-
tangle the vegetative from the minimally conscious state.
‘Vegetative’ is not the same as minimally conscious
It remains very challenging to differentiate behaviorally
vegetative from minimally conscious patients because
both are, by definition, non-communicative. Functional
imaging can be of utmost value here in objectively
differentiating activation patterns in the two clinical
entities, measured during external stimulation [12].www.sciencedirect.comRecently, Schiff et al. were the first to use fMRI to study
two minimally conscious patients and their results
revealed language-related cortical activation with audi-
tory stimulation using personalized narratives [14]. Along
the same lines, PET [15] and fMRI [16] reports have used
complex auditory stimuli demonstrating large-scale net-
work activation in the minimally conscious state, nor-
mally not observed in vegetative patients.
In conclusion, the increasing use of functional neuro-
imaging will improve our clinical characterization of
vegetative and minimally conscious survivors of severe
brain damage, not only to redefine their diagnosis, but also
to differentiate patients in terms of treatment (including
administration of analgesics and access to neuro-rehabilita-
tion programs), likely outcome, and end-of-life decisions.
Prospects for the future
Given the absence of a thorough understanding of the
neural correlates of consciousness, functional
Update TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.9 No.12 December 2005 559neuroimaging results should be used with appropriate
caution. There is, at present, no validated objective
‘consciousness meter’ that can be used as proof or disproof
of awareness in severely brain-damaged patients. As
pointed out by Owen et al. [17], a more powerful approach
to identify ‘volition without action’ in patients who are
unable to communicate their experiences might be to scan
patients while they are asked to perform a mental imagery
task, rather than using the passive external stimulation
paradigms described above. Reproducible and anatomi-
cally specific activation in individual patients during tasks
that unequivocally require ‘willed action’ or intentionality
for their completion could be argued to reflect awareness
unambiguously. Of course, negative findings in the same
circumstances could not (and should not) be used as
evidence for lack of awareness.
At present, much more data and methodological
validation is urgently needed before functional neuroima-
ging studies can be proposed to the medical community as
a tool to disentangle the clinical ‘gray zone’ that separates
vegetative states from states of minimal consciousness.Acknowledgements
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illuminated moving pattern seems to reverse direction [1].
Kline et al. suggested that this illusory motion reversal
(IMR) could originate in spurious responses of classical
Reichardt motion detectors[2]; however, others consider
the phenomenon to be an analogue of the wagon wheel
illusion and take it as evidence that the visual system
processes the world using discrete samples [1,3–5]. Intheir recent article supporting the discrete sampling
theory, Andrews and Purves [3] highlight a recent finding
that IMR occurs most often for stimuli with a particular
temporal frequency rather than a particular velocity. In
other words, IMR appears to be temporal-frequency
tuned. According to Andrews and Purves, this contradicts
the theory that the illusion results from spurious
responses of Reichardt motion detectors because, they
claim, ‘Reichardt motion detectors are tuned to velocity
rather than temporal frequency’ (p.263).
